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Summary 
The recent war against Iraq was strategically explained and morally justified as a necessary 
preemption to save America from terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). Unilateral military interventions, sometimes preventive, sometimes retaliatory, 
but mostly short, played a part in American foreign policy throughout the 1990s, with 
right-wing US politicians putting pressure on the government to intervene against 
Saddam Hussein for a number of years. Thus, the war did not come out of the blue. What 
was new was the elevation of preemptive strikes to a military doctrine by a presidential 
document, the National Security Strategy (NSS), which presented preemptive strikes as a 
regular future instrument for the American military in an ongoing and long lasting “war 
against terror”. Although embellished with Wilsonian language on the promotion of 
democracy and human rights, this document defines military power as the primary tool of 
US foreign policy which will ultimately, under American leadership, introduce democratic 
reforms in the Greater Middle East and elsewhere.  
The diplomatic prelude to the first application in Iraq in the United Nations Security 
Council led to a compromise text in November 2002 that was based on open dissent on 
“automaticity” (for America to go to war should she judge Iraqi compliance to be 
insufficient); later in February/March 2003 a proposed second resolution was openly 
defeated in spite of extraordinary American pressure; a promising last minute proposal 
was rejected by the US. 
The bitterness of transatlantic and intra-European divisions is without precedent. All 
partners were affected by it. In Germany, foreign policy consensus fell apart and its 
cushioned situation in a benign hegemonial system ended. Britain’s customary eagerness 
to please the US in security affairs paid off badly. The problems of European Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) were laid open. They will remain unresolved, and will 
prohibit serious European actions in real crises, until there is a radical change of the 
international situation, be it an American return to isolationism versus Europe, a change 
in the British basic orientation, or the emergence of security priorities which force all 
European partners to make sacrifices in sovereignty and resources. If nothing like this 
happens, the Europeans will continue to paper over their CFSP problems. 
The author, a retired German diplomat, spent 18 years in international organizations, 
at last as ambassador to the various arms control processes and in the OSCE in Vienna. 
He is currently engaged in writing and teaching. He prepared this report in 2003 as a 
visiting fellow of the Robert Schuman Center of the European University Institute in 
Florence. He gratefully acknowledges the invaluable help by its library and by its staff. 
Following a thorough review process at PRIF, the report was updated in July 2004. 
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 1. The “National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America” of September 2002 – an Overall Presentation 
Until 1991 the West had a common enemy. From then until 1995 East and West lived in 
harmony, and changes in the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav areas seemed manageable on 
a consensual basis. From 1995 until 2001 (September 11, to be precise), problems of 
change had become messy and burdensome but were mostly left to the benevolent 
hegemony of the United States for settlement. For a year after, the West seemed to have 
regained a unity of purpose in combating globalized terrorism, a new enemy of mankind. 
Just one year later, in the autumn of 2002, America’s hegemony, its nature and intentions, 
became the subject of bitter discussion. The divisions permeated many societies, and all 
alliances. It affected all security institutions. A presidential document on American 
security strategy played a central role in these debates.  
An Act of Congress from 1986 obliges the American president to submit such reports 
periodically. The news value of most preceding documents of this kind had been limited. 
This time the echo was widespread. Whereas neo-conservatives like Norman Podhoretz 
praised the “Bush doctrine” in almost hymnic terms for its “moral decisiveness and 
political resolve”,1 the liberal foreign policy establishment of the East and West coasts 
mostly concentrated on the risks involved.2  
The document with the official title “National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America”3 (henceforth NSS) enumerates eight strategic objectives some of which are 
difficult to give practical meaning (such as the sentences on human dignity and the 
centrality of moral principles); others (such as the promotion of free trade and economic 
 
 
 
1 Norman Podhoretz, In Praise of the Bush Doctrine, in: Commentary, September 2002, p 20. 
Outstanding amongst numerous other eulogies: Philip Zelikow, The Transformation of National 
Security – Five Redefinitions, in: The National Interest, Spring 2003, pp. 17ff. 
2 Outstanding the Occasional Paper of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences “War with Iraq. Costs, 
Consequences and Alternatives”, Cambridge/Mass., 2002 (henceforth: War with Iraq). Based on a 
meeting of the Committee on International Security Studies of the academy as early as October, 2002, 
this publication in three chapters covers the overall problems of the “New National Security Strategy” 
(by Carl Kaysen/John D. Steinbruner/Martin B. Malin), on the merits and risks of an attack against Iraq 
(by Steven E. Miller) and on the economic consequences of such an attack (by William D. Nordhaus). 
Also thought provoking is Andrew J. Bacevich: “A new war on behalf of freedom and against evil, akin to 
nazism re-legitimated the exercise of American power […].” But the author questions the legitimacy and 
warns against the consequences of an unlimited war against terrorism, which is “a tactic and not an 
enemy”; Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire, Cambridge/Mass. (Harvard University Press) 2002, pp. 
231. Joseph E. Nye in his numerous books and articles deserves, of course, special mention. Also of 
interest: Jack Snyder, Imperial Temptations, in: The National Interest, spring 2003, pp. 29ff. 
Representative for a German position is Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, Amerikas Mission, in: SWP Aktuell, Nr. 
38, October 2002, and, from a legal point of view, Christian Tomuschat, Der selbstverliebte Hegemon, 
in: Internationale Politik, Nr. 5, 2003, pp. 39ff. 
3 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), September 2002, www.whitehouse. 
gov/nsc/nss.pdf 
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growth or the resolution of regional conflicts) continue traditional lines with certain 
modifications. Promises to sharply increase development aid programs and efforts to 
combat AIDS, though much applauded at the time of issue, have not been followed up by 
credible action. Much has been written about the Wilsonian language on democracy at 
the end of the document, and we will return to that later in this chapter. But the most 
concrete and, at the same time the most innovative and controversial announcement, is 
the doctrine of preemptive war against “rogue states” capable of providing terrorists with 
weapons of mass destruction (henceforth WMD). The second innovation is the intention 
to maintain military forces stronger than any potential rival and, above all, to deter such 
rivals from seeking equality. The relevant passage reads: “Our forces will be strong enough 
to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of 
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the Unites States”.4  
As American armed forces are already larger and better equipped than the fifteen 
ranked behind them in international statistics, this statement will hardly change anything 
in the real world. What’s new is the elevation of military superiority to a national doctrine 
and the formal statement of the US’s intention to “dissuade” others to close up.5  
The NSS appeared at the time of President Bush’s declaration at the UN General 
Assembly (September 20) in which he referred the Iraqi problem to the Security Council 
while expressly reserving America’s right to take the issue into her own hands if the latter 
“failed its responsibilities”. Thus, the affirmation of America’s unilateral right to military 
interventions found world-wide echo as providing a “blueprint for a perpetual series of 
hot wars and preventive strikes initiated whenever it is determined that another state is 
accumulating threatening weapons or harboring terrorists”.6  
The present report tries to analyze the political problems of such a doctrine, its impact 
on the United Nations’ system, the legal and moral issues involved, and above all, its 
consequences for European unity. As the literature on all these issues is already enormous, 
but mostly quite specialized, I am aiming at a synopsis of the historic, legal and political 
aspects.  
Firstly, a remark on terminology: the term “preemption” played a role in early nuclear 
strategy when both American and Soviet strategists in different phases were tempted by 
the idea of an all-out “decapitating” nuclear strike against the adversary.7 Since then in 
 
 
 
4 Ibid., p. 30. 
5 Such ideas had lingered in conservative circles since Paul Wolfowitz, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, had included them, in March 2002 in a policy paper on future US force postures, 
although at the time President Bush Sr. ordered the paper to be withdrawn for fear of negative effects on 
his re-election campaign. 
6 Carl Kaysen et al., U.S. National Security Policy: In Search of Balance, in: War with Iraq, see above 
(footnote 2), p. 4. 
7 Gregg Herken, Counsels of War, Expanded Edition, New York (Oxford University Press), 1987, notably 
pp. 97, 145, 159, 165. 
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American military terminology the word “preemptive” is reserved for short-term strikes 
whereas “preventive” relates to mid- or long-term action. Current political language 
follows this practice. Lawyers continue to speak of “preventive self-defense” also against 
imminent dangers.  
As a consequence of the priority given to the fight against terrorism, the defense 
against future attacks with WMD, and in particular the collusion between terrorists and 
“rogues states”, other security concerns have been downgraded. Nuclear proliferation, for 
instance, is mentioned only in passing. This reflects a change of priority. Classical nuclear 
arms control concentrated on the objective size of the nuclear potential and the likeliness 
of its use; therefore, friendly nuclear threshold countries like Japan or Brazil were also 
under close scrutiny (Israel was always an exception). Today, the perceived intentions and 
the reliability of a state are decisive. In the last analysis, the use of nuclear weapons was 
seen as the ultimate, the most horrible of possible terrorist actions. As if to atone for the 
cursory treatment of proliferation problems, the White House published an additional 
paper two months later called “National Strategy to combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction” but it remained widely unnoticed.  
Amongst local conflicts only the Middle East is mentioned as a central concern. The 
Cashmere problem, which could lead to the first nuclear confrontation in history, is 
portrayed as a local problem, which the two protagonists, India and Pakistan, will 
hopefully solve (a correct estimate as it now seems). They both receive honorable mention 
as partners in fighting terrorism. “Global terrorism” is singled out as the main danger. 
The United States is declared to be at war with that “particularly elusive enemy” which 
comprises “terrorists of global reach”, above all, Al Qaeda. But as “no cause justifies 
terror”, the paper concludes that “all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism 
will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy or genocide”.8 Such a principle would 
outlaw all acts of “asymmetric warfare” including national insurgencies and would, if 
successfully applied, lead to a global preservation of the status quo, however unjust. 
Universal and regional institutions of co-operative security are not given a central role. 
The United Nations’ system is mentioned twice, and only in passing: as a partner in the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan and in the fight against Aids in Africa. NATO is portrayed 
as a task rather than an asset: if it can be reformed, enlarged, and strengthened, it may 
reappear “as central to the security and the interests of its member states as was the case 
during the Cold War”.9 European efforts to “forge a greater foreign policy and defense 
identity” are mentioned without further comment. As a partner in business, the EU 
appears only in the promotion of African regional stability, and is bypassed altogether in 
the promotion of international trade. Post-conflict reconstruction and regional stability 
 
 
 
8 NSS, see above (footnote 3), pp. 5 - 6. 
9 Ibid., p. 26. 
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by co-operation, the two fields in which the European Union is most successful, are barely 
mentioned.  
All in all, the paper portrays the state of mind of a leadership obsessed by one 
traumatizing experience and dominated by the fear of its repetition; the picture of an 
administration at war. Indeed, throughout the Iraqi campaign and thereafter, the 
administration stressed the continuity of the war against “terrorism”. This state of mind 
explains many side aspects, such as the stridency in political discussions with trusted 
allies, the preference of pressure over persuasion in diplomacy, the classification of friends 
and foes, the moral indignation over allies who prefer a peaceful solution, and finally, the 
sometimes absurd virility cult practiced by certain American columnists. Worse still, the 
concentration on global terrorism blocks the view of the “indispensable nation” for other 
global problems such as the environment and the north-south relationship. Terrorism 
may be more to geo-politics than “a strong wind is to geography – a potent, spectacular, 
and destructive element, but one that affects surface features, not underlying tectonic 
forces and the location of fault lines”.10 To remain in the picture, global terrorism could 
instead be compared with a series of earthquakes which are indeed caused by underlying 
tectonic forces. But here the image ceases to be useful: as social phenomena, these forces 
can be prevented by social strategies that go to the roots of tension. 
Of course, the American nation suffered a traumatic shock from its second Pearl 
Harbor. This vibrant society, with its superb political-intellectual life, will one day return 
to a more balanced approach. After “9/11”, the American government, in its warlike 
mood, was more concerned with striking than with healing.11 Consequently, after a 
brilliant military campaign in Iraq, it had no convincing concept for reconstruction. 
Widely ignoring local conditions, the Pentagon, to whom this task was entrusted, simply 
put its hopes in the gratitude of the Iraqi population for its liberation; “nation building” 
would be accomplished by a transitional military government with comprehensive 
responsibilities – a solution last practiced in Japan and Germany in 1945 but by a different 
military (which as conscript armies represented the open mind of the American and 
British societies) in different countries (homogeneous and industrialized nation states). 
In contrast to this warlike emphasis of military power, the document contains 
numerous evocations of human rights, human dignity and pledges to promote freedom, 
democracy, progress and free-market economy all over the world. This blend of pragmatic 
power politics and idealistic aims strings a cord with an American audience. The same is 
true for the self-confident language on American leadership in an inevitable development 
towards “democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner in the 
 
 
 
10 Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era, New York, 2002, p. 109. 
11 The hope expressed in the previous sentence is apparently about to come true as the final report of the 
Sept 11 commission includes a call for a broad rethinking of American foreign policy towards the Arab 
and Muslim world, declaring that the United States need “a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, 
political as it is military”. Cf. David E. Sanger in International Herald Tribune 24/25 July 2004. 
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world”. The president expressly welcomes the responsibility of the United States in this 
great mission “to further freedom’s triumph over all the foes of mankind”.12 Such 
manifestations of American exceptionalism go down well with a public still traumatized 
by the attack on two of its national symbols. This “distinctly American internationalism”, 
as the paper calls it, also justifies the military superiority over all “rival powers”: 
preserving American security and superiority furthers the interests of mankind as a whole. 
But the document is vague on the “missing link”: how to transform military power into 
human progress.  
2. Historic Background 
2.1 International Precedents  
There have been several American military interventions over the last few decades. Some 
of them, such as the mining of Nicaraguan ports by Reagan in 1984 or the bombing of 
Libya in April 1986, were in conflict with international law. The hidden support for the 
Contra insurgency in Nicaragua (1984 to 1987) was opposed by Congress and was 
financed by doubtful means. The action against Libya was a short “surgical” retaliation; 
most other actions took place in Latin America, a traditional US backyard, and some of 
them had a semblance of justification by cold war power relations. The air strikes in 
August 1998, labeled “Infinite Reach”, on a chemical plant in Sudan and an Al Qaeda 
training camp in Afghanistan were intended to retaliate for Al Qaeda attacks against the 
destroyer “USS Cole” and the American Embassy in Daressalam: no serious harm was 
done to the Afghan camp, and the plant in Sudan turned out to produce fertilizers. This 
touch of half-heartedness and inefficiency produced intense anger from the Republican 
opposition and skeptical irony from the Europeans. 
Operation “Allied Force” against Yugoslavia which ran from April to June 1999 started 
without a Security Council mandate (unobtainable in the face of declared Russian and 
probable Chinese opposition). It clearly violated the UN charter, but it was recognized by 
the whole Western world as a cogent necessity to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and 
to stop Serbian nationalism, which in the previous crises had laid bare the inadequacies of 
traditional peaceful crisis management.  
In December 1998 the US together with Great Britain launched “Desert Fox”, an air 
operation against Iraq, targeting suspected biological warfare facilities and Republican 
guard barracks. This was done in reaction to Iraq’s unwillingness to co-operate with 
UNSCOM; the United Nations’ arms control inspection team, set up at the end of the 
Kuwait war. “Desert Fox” was criticized by the American radical conservatives as typical 
 
 
 
12 Both quotes from the presidents’ cover letter to the NSS, see above (footnote 3). 
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Clintonian symbolic military enterprise, destined to satisfy public opinion and to do as if 
the evildoers were punished – “by bombing the desert”. In legal terms the two powers 
justified their actions by the same arguments they used in March 2003 (“continued 
authority”, see below, Chapter 5), but at that time nobody cared.  
To sum up, previous US administrations have used armed force, mostly on a limited 
scale, and mostly without consultations (Grenada, a Commonwealth country, was 
occupied without even informing Britain). None of these actions produced any 
transatlantic crisis. But they are early indicators of unilateral tendencies. In particular, the 
Clinton administration, so much maligned by the Republican opposition for lacking 
clout, had prepared the intellectual ground for present actions. It was Clinton’s last 
Defense Secretary, William Cohen, who first defined the danger, which his successor 
professed to be fighting in Iraq: Cohen repeatedly warned of the danger of terrorists 
acquiring WMD from “rogue states”. And Foreign Secretary Madeleine Albright spared 
no effort in forging a national and international consensus on the Kosovo war in the 
absence of a UN mandate. The lack of a mandate even suited American intentions of the 
time: NATO, as the representation of most Western democracies, was to be established as 
an alternative source of legitimacy for enforcement measures. Efforts to include 
corresponding language into the NATO Summit Declaration of Washington (April 1999) 
met with European resistance. But “Madeleine’s war” revealed a tendency to neglect the 
UN system in favor of unilateral action. Washington regarded NATO’s self-mandated war 
as a useful precedent, whereas all European NATO members considered it an exceptional 
case, which was highly controversial in their citizens’ opinions. 
2.2 Domestic Precedents 
Another string of events includes the debate between traditional conservatives and neo-
conservatives within the Republican Party. President Bush Sr. decided to stop his forces at 
the Kuwaiti border in 1991, partly because he expected Saddam Hussein to be toppled by 
his defeat, partly because his military leaders, with General Powell at the top, feared too 
many casualties. The UN Security Council mandated the coalition only to liberate Kuwait, 
not to occupy Iraq, it was said. Neo-conservative columnists immediately challenged this 
decision which remained controversial within the Republican Party. At the time, Secretary 
of Defense Cheney made comments which make fascinating reading today: 
“[…] if you are going to go in and try to topple Saddam Hussein you have to go to 
Baghdad. Once you’ve got Baghdad it’s not clear what to do with it. It’s not clear what kind 
of government you would put in place of the one that’s currently there now. [...] How much 
credibility is that government going to have if it’s set up by the United States military when 
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it’s there? How long does the United States military have to stay to protect people that sign 
on for that government and what happens to it once we leave?”13 
The first Bush administration opted for a policy of “comprehensive containment”. 
Security Council resolution 687 dated April 3, 1991 established a system of inspections to 
remove all WMD, carried out by UNSCOM and enforced by an embargo on Iraq’s oil 
exports. To protect the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north the two Anglo-
Saxon powers established two no-flight zones with regular patrol flights. 
Under the pressure of economic sanctions the Iraqi government at first co-operated 
reasonably well with UNSCOM until 1997 notwithstanding occasional outbursts of anger 
and national pride. After that date, they started to sabotage the work of the inspectors 
until UNSCOM was forced to end its operation in late autumn 1998. 
Some observers maintained that containment by inspections and economic sanctions 
led to the destruction of most of the chemical and biological weapons. (That Saddam 
Hussein stopped his nuclear program after his defeat in the Kuwait war was beyond 
reasonable doubt). Official US policy always continued to consider Iraqi arms control as 
unfinished business to be pursued with intensified pressure. The neo-conservative wing of 
the republican opposition drew a different conclusion from Saddam’s new course of 
obstruction: containment had run its course and had to be replaced by forcible 
disarmament and regime change. This new attitude was laid down in an open letter dated 
January 26, 1998, by prominent Republicans urging President Clinton “to implement a 
strategy for removing Saddam’s regime from power”. The list of the 18 signatories reads 
like a “who’s who” of the present administration and its journalistic supporters.  
Under such pressure, the Clinton administration in December 1998 resorted to 
operation “Desert Fox”. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger presented it as a synthesis 
of containment and regime change: “this strategy [...] is to contain Saddam in the short 
and in the medium term by force if necessary, and to work towards a new government 
over the long term.” However, in October 1999 the Republican majority in Congress 
forced through an Iraq “Liberation Act”, which formulates as “the sense of the Congress” 
that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove Saddam 
Hussein from power in Iraq.  
Economic sanctions, an essential part of containment, deprived the country of its main 
source of income, oil revenues. Later an “oil for food” program was introduced to bring 
some relief to the suffering masses. All these measures combined weakened the power of 
the Iraqi state as it demoralized the regular army, decisively degraded its combat 
capacities, damaged its oil industry, and weakened the moral of the people. However, it 
also fastened the grip of the regime on the population; it was detrimental to regime 
change as it destroyed the middle class, the possible pillar of a reformed and more 
 
 
 
13 Quoted by Steven E. Miller, Gambling on War: Force, Order, and the Implications of Attacking Iraq, in: 
War with Iraq, see above (footnote 2), p. 40. 
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democratic regime. It also created a parasitic network of smugglers, black marketers and 
gangsters which at present specializes in looting, robbing and smuggling and will no 
doubt find other lucrative professions as the present disorder continues. The most 
convincing moral arguments for a much earlier use of military force could be found in the 
senseless cruelty of a containment policy which made the country suffer more, than, say, 
its conquest by the victorious coalition army in March 1992.  
The chorus of advocates of regime change grew over the years (the advocate of 
moderation of 1991, Dick Cheney, joined them by signing the open letter mentioned 
earlier). Nevertheless, the new administration, in its early days, cooperated in traditional 
containment by improving the United Nations sanctions system (the “smart sanctions” 
resolution 1382 of June 2002). President Bush may already have been leaning towards 
regime change under the influence of conservative advisors. But it took the shock of 
September 11, 2001, to change policy. After that date military power “emerged as never 
before as the preferred instrument of American state craft”.14 As early as the first cabinet 
meeting on September 15, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld mentioned Iraq as an object of 
military action but the president decided that Afghanistan had priority.15 However, by this 
stage he was already thinking in terms of a global war in which Afghanistan would be only 
the first campaign. The new enemy – globalised terrorism – was as dangerous but more 
elusive than previous enemies. As another war against the enemies of freedom, a national 
effort in America’s great tradition, it would last long and claim sacrifices. The term 
“crusade” offered itself naturally, and speechwriters came to learn that it offended Muslim 
ears. The enemy was likened to predecessors like Nazism, Japanese militarism, and Soviet 
communism, so that her own effort could be legitimized by the great liberal principles of 
W. Wilson and F. D. Roosevelt. Thus, the president managed to rally the nation in a 
masterly manner behind his purposes, but this war rhetoric also gained a life of its own as 
a legal concept: If the US are at war, zealous lawyers wrote in various memos, the 
president as Commander-in-Chief, enjoys complete discretion in the exercise of his war 
powers; in the light of his “complete authority over the conduct of war, [...] criminal 
statutes are not read infringing on the president’s ultimate authority in these areas”.16 
 
 
 
14 Bacevich, see above (footnote 2), p. 230. 
15 Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York (Simon and Schuster), 2002, pp. 75, 91. 
16 Working Group Report, “Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on 
Terrorism: Assessment of Legal Historical Policy and Operational Considerations”, March 6, 2003, 
published on the website of the Wall Street Journal, p. 20. 
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3. The Doctrine Applied 
3.1 Preparations for War 
In his message on the State of the Nation in January 2002, President Bush mentioned Iraq 
as part of the “axis of evil”. During his Berlin visit in May 2002, Bush mentioned Iraq 
several times but Schröder was in no mood to discuss it. By summer, the discussion 
focused on how to initiate and justify the war. Both Prime Minister Blair and Secretary 
Powell advocated a Security Council resolution particularly to ensure support, or at least 
toleration, from moderate Arab states. Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and his Deputy 
Paul Wolfowitz opposed this idea and a legendary turf battle ensued. The draft of 
President Bush’s UN speech was revised 21 times, with the reference to a Security Council 
resolution alternatively included (at the insistence of the State Department) and deleted 
(under pressure from the Pentagon). Bush delivered his speech before the United Nations’ 
General Assembly on September 12. He signed his document on the NNS on September 
20. The United States and Great Britain submitted their draft resolution to the Security 
Council on September 30.  
After complicated negotiations the Council issued its Resolution 1441 on November 8. 
It provided for a new and stringent inspection regime as a last chance, and it produced a 
diplomatic problem called “automaticity”: the text stated that Iraq would face the “gravest 
consequences” if it violated its new obligations. But who would determine the violations? 
Who would decide on the consequences? Resolution 1441 contains compromise formulae 
on these questions but was accompanied by contradictory interpretative statements. The 
American Delegate, seconded by his British colleague, declared that if the Security Council 
“failed to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violation the resolution did not 
constrain any member state from acting to defend itself from a threat posed by that 
country” (official recordings of the Security Council meeting of November 8, 2002). 
France, China and Russia submitted the opposite interpretation: the use of force would 
require an additional resolution. Thus, the question of “automaticity” was answered by an 
unclear text accompanied by two opposing interpretations. It is therefore difficult to 
consider Resolution 1441 as a mandate to resort to war. Probably anticipating such an 
equivocal result, the United States and Great Britain had maintained throughout the 
proceedings that in reality they were already vested with a Security Council authorization 
to use force (dating back to 1991) and that they had seized the Security Council only to 
show co-operation and to give Iraq a last chance (see below, Chapter 5).  
3.2 The Division of the West  
Meanwhile, popular opposition against the American war plans rose up all over Europe. It 
was particularly adamant in Germany where American plans of massive initial bombing 
(“shock and awe”) revived memories of the extinction of German cities fifty years ago. 
Publications on these bomb raids, long suppressed as politically incorrect for distracting 
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the German mind from its own war guilt, had recently mushroomed. Predictions of a 
humanitarian disaster, including the mass starvation of children, also found a broad echo.  
Judging by past experience, a German chancellor might have been expected to establish 
an all-party consensus on the need for transatlantic solidarity, to cautiously regret the 
decision to go to war, to express the hope of its short duration and to explain the 
impossibility for Germany to participate. Foreign Minister Fischer claimed from the 
outset to be guided by security concerns: He predicted “Chaos” in the region and dangers 
for the Middle East peace process. Chancellor Schröder, probably in full knowledge of 
American war planning against Iraq, warned at an early stage, that his support would not 
be extended to “adventures”, but he tried to keep the subject out of discussion until July, 
always referring to the promise by Bush to consult him if necessary. The heavier the 
military built-up, the harsher the American rhetoric, the greater the popular excitement 
on both sides of the Atlantic, the less credible this formula became. Finally Schröder used 
Vice President Cheney’s call for a “regime change” in his August 26 address as an excuse 
for openly declaring his opposition. Of course he also wanted to boost his ailing reelection 
campaign. It is hard to understand why a democratic politician should be blamed for 
expressing the profound anxieties of his electorates. A big part of the nation expected 
public guidance and had waited for it impatiently. Campaign considerations apart, it was 
logical for the German government to oppose a war which it considered unpromising and 
dangerous. Logically, but not rationally, one might object since this was a symbolic act 
without any open third party support and, internationally, fraught with tensible 
disadvantages. But by its opposition, the German government paved the way for the 
future coalition with France and Russia, and Schröder set an international sign which 
later, in February/March 2003, consolidated in a strategy of war prevention. In 
Washington, German-American relations were defined as “poisoned”. There were reasons 
for American resentments on certain side issues but above all there was a need for a 
diplomatic quarantine around Germany in order to deter others. 17 
For the German establishment, a world collapsed. German diplomacy had felt 
comfortable in a network of institutions in which highly important security issues were 
constantly consulted. They were proud of being admitted to almost all restricted 
diplomatic circles, like the “QAD” (US, Great Britain, France and Germany), which 
discretely pre-consulted on most security issues and prepared multilateral conferences, or 
 
 
 
17 A Bavarian Bundestag deputy for the SPD, probably the last one with an education in classical languages, 
compared Bush with “Caesar Augustus” which should have flattered the president. But the minister of 
justice committed the gravest mistake a German politician could possibly make: she compared Bush to 
“Nazi Adolf” which not only disqualified her as a tactician but also as a historian: in 1939, Hitler’s 
economic war machine was well prepared, and he had no reason to detract German attention from 
economic problems. Schröder’s letter of regret (published online by FAZnet on November 19, 2002, is 
generally considered inadequate. But the real reason for Washington’s official anger was based on 
politics, not on courtesy.  
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the Balkans Contact Group, or the “G8” (the group of the wealthiest industrial countries, 
which also deals with foreign policy matters). 
Now, for several weeks there were no German-American contacts on the political level 
and few between mid-level officials. Until January 2003, Germany was internationally 
isolated. Its domestic foreign policy consensus, hitherto unshakeable, was broken. 
Opposition leader, Angela Merkel, during a tour to the US, was warmly welcomed by the 
Bush administration and distanced herself from the chancellor’s course. But the CDU 
soon found out that the public did not honor this attitude (Edmund Stoiber, their 
candidate for chancellor, never shared it). The fact remains that the two nations, in a 
question of war and peace, held opposite positions and openly fought them out, with 
much bitterness on both sides. For most Germans the Iraq war was a frivolous war of 
choice fought for geopolitical or even economic reasons; most Americans believed until 
recently that it was an existential necessity, a just war in defense of the homeland.  
As a permanent member of the Security Council, France had again become a major 
actor, to the delight of its policy makers. In September and October 2002 many French 
commentaries expressed superiority over Germany, which, by lack of flexibility, was left 
without influence. At that time, France seemed prepared to eventually vote for, and 
participate in, military coercion. The working atmosphere between the French and 
American delegations was excellent throughout the negotiations of Resolution 1441. Only 
later did the French realize that Washington wanted a preventive war regardless of 
inspection results. The turning point was probably January 10, 2003.18 The fortieth 
anniversary of the Elysée treaty (end of January 2003) offered an opportunity to present a 
common Franco-German platform, this time with security issues at its centre, an old goal 
of Gaullist policy. Traditional German Atlanticists, particularly influential in high 
positions of the Foreign Office, realized the Anti-American thrust in all that, but 
Germany, in her isolation, had no alternative. To make matters even worse for them, 
Russia was co-opted to a group that actively opposed a major American purpose.  
The British followed a tradition that was best described by Raymond Aron forty years 
ago. In his book Paix et Guerre Entre les Nations Aron writes:  
 
 
 
18 When Iraq presented its report on the destruction of its WMD to the Security Council, Paris considered 
it defective, but reparable. But it was rejected in Washington as totally inadequate and a violation of 
Resolution 1441 in itself. This and the following information, particularly in Chapter 4 is based on the 
author’s interviews with high-ranking German officials. A valuable additional source is the article by 
James P. Rubin, Stumbling into War, in: Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003, pp.46 - 66. Rubin 
was Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs in the Clinton administration and is now Visiting 
Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics. His presentation is based on 
insider information obtained in London and he frequently refers to unnamed British officials, less than 
happy about the course of events. The best chronicle in the media, written by Gerard Baker and others is: 
“The Divided West”, a series of four articles in: Financial Times, May 28-31, 2003. He corroborates most 
of Rubin’s and my own information.  
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“The British governments since December 1941 have all been convinced that the American 
alliance was indispensable in order first of all to win the war, then to ensure the security of 
Great Britain, they accepted the American leadership as inevitable. As the result of this 
resolution (or resignation) British tactics always involved the same procedure: first to 
convince the American leaders to adopt the policy London regarded as best, subsequently to 
influence public opinion and the organs of public opinion. And once the American leaders 
have taken a decision, if even contrary to London’s preferences, London will follow the 
leader without losing hope that events or criticism will open his eyes. It is by discussion, 
loyalty and presence that the British attempt to influence the United States.”19 
Up to this day, British practice corresponds to this description – a remarkable continuity 
over all political turns of over half a century, including the Suez shock of 1956. London 
fared well with it and therefore saw no reason for change, certainly not for the prospect of 
a common European security policy. In October 2002, Blair told the cabinet: “We must 
steer close to America. If we don’t, we will lose our influence to shape what they do.”20 
However, this time the traditional recipe strained the national consensus and weakened 
Blair’s political position. No doubt, the prestige of the British army was increased by its 
determination and skill in fighting and in pacifying its area. But the overzealous efforts at 
public diplomacy produced mixed results. It started with a “White Paper” of September 
2002, which contained exaggerations in central points, to be followed by a dossier in 
February cobbled together by a junior ace from other sources including a University 
seminar paper that contained the canard on Iraq’s Uranium purchase from Niger. On the 
other hand, hardliners in the Bush administration are unlikely to forget that Blair’s 
insistence led them twice into Security Council negotiations, which they disliked in 
principle and which went wrong in practice. In turn, this negative outcome can be 
attributed, at least partly, to a lack of flexibility from Washington, and there is a good deal 
of unhappiness amongst British officials about it, which slowly pierces the veil of the 
legendary discretion of British bureaucracy.21 Above all, Pfaff writes: “The foreign office 
and Downing Street have recognised that the Bush administration is exploiting Britain’s 
position in Europe in a way that is destructive of Britain’s interests.”22  
 
 
 
19 Raymond Aron, Paix et Guerre Entre les Nations, Paris (Calman-Lévy), 1962, p. 461, here quoted from 
an English edition. 
20 According to the diary of Robin Cook, as quoted by Warren Hoge, Cook’s Diary Casts Doubt on Blair, 
in: International Herald Tribune, October 6, 2003. To this day, Prime Minister Blair claims that in 
addition to doing the right thing in British-American relations he was right in substance: an evil dictator 
was removed and conditions in the Middle East are improved. 
21 Such regrets clearly surface in Rubin, see above (footnote 18), notably pages 51 and 54 (“A continuing 
source of bitterness for British officials”). Note also the column by William Pfaff with a telling title which 
reflects the uneasiness of the British military with American counterinsurgency tactics: William Pfaff, 
This could be the End of a Beautiful Friendship, in: International Herald Tribune, January 15, 2004.  
22 Pfaff, see above (footnote 21). 
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4. Hopes, Fears and Consequences 
4.1 The End of Peace Efforts  
The controversies in the Security Council during the first weeks of 2003 were a disgrace to 
NATO, to the European Union, and to diplomacy. In the face of a war that some wanted, 
others feared, passions ran high, crisis management by compromise was replaced by legal 
tricks, accompanied by an unprecedented use of pressure, if not intimidation. Phone lines 
between heads of states ran hot. It began with a Security Council meeting, which the 
French Foreign Minister had scheduled for January 20, to discuss terrorism on a 
ministerial level but then surprised Secretary Powell with a broadside on the American 
position on Iraq. This was a radical turn in French behavior, explicable only by President 
Chirac’s change of mind some days earlier. Powell has resented this “highjacking” of his 
presence ever since. He suffered another setback on February 5, when he failed to 
convince the Security Council of Iraq’s “material breaches”. Few of the facts he presented 
were new and the new assertions could not be proven. In this situation, American 
diplomacy gave the unfortunate impression of relying on pressure for lack of convincing 
arguments. 
To quote but one example, President Putin would later relate that President Bush had 
told him in one of his phone calls that he “risked the strategic relationship with the United 
States”. Putin replied dryly that avoidance of war in Iraq also had strategic importance.23  
On February 20, the French Ambassador in Washington, Levitte, in a conversation 
with Deputy Security Advisor Hadley, warned the Americans not to table a second 
resolution in the Security Council. It would cause unnecessary damage, he argued; if the 
US went to war without another resolution, its legality would be “hazy” but could still be 
maintained. If they sought another resolution and were rejected, the illegality of the war 
would be brought out in daylight.24 Hadley accepted the argument on a personal basis. But 
the administration was committed: they had promised to try to get a second resolution to 
Prime Minister Blair, who needed it for his own audience.  
This is not the place to tell the negotiating history of this second resolution, the first 
draft of which was tabled by the US, the UK and Spain on February 24.25 The United 
Nations system, with the Security Council at its core, functioned well because it did 
precisely what it was meant to do by its founders: it accurately reflected the opinion of the 
various regions of the world on a question of war and peace – Western Europe divided, 
Central and Eastern Europe loyal to their new protector, all other continents, including 
 
 
 
23 Author’s interview, March 2004. 
24 Baker, see above (footnote 18), p. 11. 
25 This is done by sources indicated above in footnote 6.  
14 Günter Joetze 
 
the emerging major powers of Russia and China, unanimously opposed. In the final 
countdown, the coalition could not secure a single vote among the undecided six 
countries.26 By asking the Security Council for a second resolution they implicitly 
devaluated their previous claims to have sufficient authority already for enforcement 
action by previous resolutions. Unwittingly, they reanimated the discussion on the central 
issues: was there a right to preemptive or preventive war? Did Iraq pose a danger that 
would justify such a war? How obvious did the danger have to be and who had the burden 
of proof? As long as the Anglo-Saxons submitted texts, which answered these questions in 
their favor by simply restating automaticity,27 they had no chance of winning a majority. It 
was a text of this kind that President Chirac threatened with a veto in his interview of 
March 10. There were last minute efforts by Britain, supported by Canada, to arrive at a 
real compromise by establishing a final delay of thirty days in which Iraq would have to 
prove total openness and full co-operation with the international inspectors, particularly 
where uncertainties still existed, e.g., in accounting for certain chemical and biological 
substances which had previously existed, and in the destruction of the remaining mid-
range missiles. Iraq would have until mid-April to meet these specific requirements, called 
“benchmarks”. After that, the coalition would have a right to strike. Although this 
compromise would have provided for “automaticity” it would also offer a long cooling-off 
period, which Germany and others would have found difficult to refuse. France 
participated in the negotiations for such a “benchmark” solution because it feared the 
consequences of a veto and in particular a war in which the allies would eventually find 
WMD. In that case “we would all be dead” said a high French official.28 But Washington 
offered only a one-week extension until mid-March. When the British realized that under 
these conditions they would only obtain the five secure votes and none of the undecided 
votes, they withdrew their proposal. 
As always, there is a vivid debate among the American political class on all aspects of 
this diplomatic defeat. Yet for a long time the majority of the American nation were 
convinced that Iraq under Saddam Hussein did pose a threat to the nation and that 
important allies deserted them. But a majority of West Europeans (including those 
nations whose governments supported America) failed to see a threat of this magnitude. 
These conflicting perceptions of basic security issues are a novelty in transatlantic history. 
It is the real source of all irritations. 
 
 
 
26 The coalition could muster four votes; the three sponsors plus Bulgaria. There were five certain 
opponents, China, France, Germany, Russia and Syria. The undecided six were Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan 
and three African states. 
27 The first draft of February 24 proposed to state “that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity 
afforded to it in resolution 1441.” The revised draft of March 7 proposed to state: “That Iraq will have 
failed to take the final opportunity […] unless on or before March 17, 2003 the Council concludes that 
Iraq has demonstrated […] co-operation.” This was a thinly veiled version of automaticity: the 
opponents of war would have needed a resolution to prevent it.  
28 Rubin, see above (footnote 18), p. 56. 
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4.2 A Diplomatic Balance Sheet 
The rift will produce after-effects in spite of present efforts at damage limitation by all 
actors. All other changes are related to it. Let us enumerate the most important ones in 
summary:  
• The British prime minister has earned little gratitude in Washington and his domestic 
position is weakened. Transatlantic loyalty will remain strong in Great Britain but 
automatic support for all American security concerns (one might call it the 
Aronsyndrome) may not be taken for granted any longer; this could have 
consequences for European foreign and security policy. 
• Germany has lost her security consensus and her cozy place in the Atlantic 
community. She had her first national security debate for twenty years (the last one 
being on mid-range nuclear missiles in the 1980s). She needed a new balance between 
her European and Atlantic orientation. All this may seem a profound change but one 
for which the time had come. This would explain the lack of excitement in the public 
and the self-assurance of the people in power. 
• The Turkish political class has suffered a shock; it is impossible to predict its effect. 
Much will depend on the consequences drawn by the Turkish general staff: they could 
either try to re-establish the special relationship with Washington or they could allow 
their politicians to make more of the necessary concessions on the way to Europe. 
• France is not much affected. She was lucky that no WMD were found in Iraq. 
American efforts to “punish” her produced scant results, also owing to globalization: a 
boycott of Michelin tires, for instance, which are produced in the United States, would 
have cost the jobs of American workers. 
• Enormous damage was done to NATO’s sense of cohesion. Within six months, the 
climate of confidence, reliability and co-operation built up by decades was destroyed 
in a negative interplay of the main actors, to which each of them contributed – as if 
they all instinctively felt they did not need each other any longer. This affects all three 
pillars of the alliance: its cohesion, its community of values, and its common purpose. 
All this happened only four years after its proudest hour in the post-conflict era, the 
Kosovo campaign of spring 1999, when NATO was in the centre of military and 
sometimes political affairs. It may remain useful, but not indispensable, as a 
“specialized agency” for post-conflict military control as recently as in Afghanistan and 
maybe even Iraq. 
• The central question of the EU deserves a separate chapter at the end of this essay. 
• The United States lost a good deal of confidence and prestige. These are renewable 
commodities for a superpower. Credibility is different. Rubin recalls the events of 
1962, “when John F. Kennedy sent former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to brief 
Charles De Gaulle about the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. Acheson 
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offered de Gaulle a full intelligence briefing, but the French president told him it 
wasn’t necessary, saying, he trusted Kennedy never to recur unless he was sure of his 
facts.”29 The damage done to credibility weakens leadership and loyalty. Leadership is 
strongest when the junior partner does not even feel to be led, when he takes it for 
granted and is content to follow. To quote the German example: at the beginning of 
the crisis, a sizeable portion of the public opinion was aghast: how could we contradict 
the United States in a security concern of the highest priority? Now the public has 
learned that it can be done without lasting damage to the nation’s interests.  
• As to nuclear counter-proliferation no clear picture emerges. The more the big states 
fear an attack by conventional forces with overwhelming firepower, the more they will 
be tempted to go nuclear. Such tendencies could already be seen after NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo. There are few important Third World countries without 
ethnic conflict potential. “I would advise them to go nuclear” an Indian general told 
the author in February 2000. In these countries, the concept of humanitarian 
intervention is mostly considered a unilateral act in which the West applies double 
standards.30 Should anticipatory self-defense remain “the centerpiece of American 
security policy”,31 such tendencies could be reinforced. In the short run fear may 
prevail and induce rulers like Gaddafi to surrender their WMD stockpiles (Libya had 
shopped around but had no program for WMD productions and military use). Of 
course, analysts like William Safire attribute this and all other positive developments to 
“America’s preemptive policy”.32 But the Iranian leaders appeared ready to give up 
their nuclear design in negotiations with three European foreign ministers and within 
the framework of IAEA. Initial US pressure was not helpful, and for a while, after the 
president had given Secretary Powell a free hand, the West, and to a degree Russia, was 
acting in concert, with promising results. 33 The hardening of Iran’s attitude in June 
2004 may be a symptom of an internal power struggle but if the Iranians still had 
reason to fear “America’s preemption” (Safire’s words) they were likely to adopt a 
much more guarded, less provocative attitude. On the contrary, their regional 
influence as the big Shiite power has increased as a consequence of the disorder in Iraq. 
In the long run it is difficult to see how the present non-proliferation system could be 
maintained if not backed up by a valid and efficient system of banning and controlling 
the use of force. Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, and later Algeria come to mind as 
openers of the floodgates.  
 
 
 
29 Ibid., p. 65. 
30 See Günter Joetze, The European Security Landscape after Kosovo, ZEI Discussion Paper C64, Centre 
for European Integration Studies, University Bonn, 2000, p. 13. 
31 Madeleine K. Albright, Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster, in: Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003, p. 3. 
32 William Safire, America is rolling back global Terror, in: International Herald Tribune, January 13, 2004, 
p. 7. 
33 Author’s interview at the German Foreign Office on January 8, 2004. 
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4.3 A Political-Military Balance Sheet 
Among the most prominent victims of the war were those military experts who predicted 
long urban warfare in Baghdad and big American casualties. Instead, in a brilliant and 
decisive adaptation of Blitzkrieg tactics US troops advanced swiftly around centers of 
resistance and cut off their supplies. As to Iraqi war casualties, the best estimate is 4300 
civilians and 9000 soldiers.34 Although the awful fire barrage of the first days is likely to 
have exacted a much higher toll, it was not the humanitarian catastrophe feared by some. 
Saddam Hussein was unable to use any of the means of asymmetric warfare ascribed to 
him. He had no time to set the oil fields on fire, he had no more SCUD missiles to menace 
Israel, and if he ever had any WMD, he had no occasion to use them. In short, the 
overwhelming military power of the US was capable of reaching the immediate war aim, 
the destruction of Saddam´s power structure and the occupation of the entire country. 
But it had taken six months to build up this terrifying force. It would have been natural 
for a powerful criminal, had he really been armed to his teeth with WMD, to resort to 
counter preemption against the buildup around him.35 He did not and the American 
leadership expressed confidence that he would not during the campaign.36 This reveals a 
basic contradiction in any doctrine of preemption: it depicts the enemy as extremely 
dangerous, yet must show confidence to destroy him without risk.37  
President Bush declared the official end to hostilities on May 1. By the end of 
December 2003 American generals qualified Iraqi resistance as a guerrilla war. To date 
(July 2004) it is costing eight times more American lives than the actual conquest. Under 
conditions of widespread resistance, crime and sabotage, no order, let alone a democratic 
one, can be established. In the Shiite area, religious intolerance, discrimination of women, 
and a preference for theocratic structures are resurging and seem out of reach by outside 
influence. But a realistic reconstruction policy will have to rely on the spiritual leaders of 
the majority population, and that is what the Transitional Authority was doing. Small 
wonder, that the Shiite leaders for the time being present themselves as moderates, and 
demand early elections. Once left alone, they are likely to use democratic forms to 
establish theocratic control.  
In the north, the existing local Kurdish power structures will not be dismantled by the 
occupation forces. Instead, the Transitional Authority has decided that the early date of 
 
 
 
34 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 30, 2003, p. 1, referring to a study of the Washington-based 
“Project for Alternative Defences”.  
35 A fear expressed by Miller, see above (footnote 13), p. 16. 
36 See quote from Secretary Rumsfeld, Jack Snyder, Imperial Temptations, in: The National Interest, Spring 
2003, p. 33. 
37 Former Foreign Secretary James Baker recalls in his memoirs that in his last conversation with Iraqi 
Foreign Minister Assis, before the war in 1991 (on January 9, 1991), he clearly told him that Iraqi use of 
WMD would meet with an American nuclear reply, quoted in Gregor Schöllgen, Die Außenpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn, 1999, p. 204. 
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transfer of sovereignty (July 1, 2004) makes it impossible to attempt such far-reaching and 
complicated administrative transactions. This means that the new Iraq will enter into 
independence with additional problems of secessionist movements and ethnic conflicts in 
the northern areas with mixed populations, especially Kirkuk. In addition, this will 
present the United States with a situation of either Turkish intervention or Turkish 
resentment. Add to this the continued resistance and the uncertainties in the Sunnite 
areas, the general lack of security, the economic problems and the sorry state of the oil 
industry, any prospects of a democratic and stable Iraq, which could serve as a model for 
other Arab countries and stimulate the whole area towards development and self-
determination, are hard to discern. 
There are additional problems affecting the military: unless defeat were conceded, 
more than half of the combat strength of the American armed forces will remain 
immobilized in Iraq for an unforeseeable period of time. This makes future interventions 
dependent on the co-operation of other nations including those of “Old Europe”. 
Moreover, continued occupation would necessitate an excessive use of reservists and 
National Guards – with grave risks for the troops’ morale and domestic support.
38
 To 
make matters worse, post-conflict reconstruction by the American army appears infinitely 
more complicated than foreseen. These troops are trained to be professional fighters in 
technical combat, but are structurally unfit to control, let alone rebuild, unfamiliar 
societies. Trained for technical combat with the avoidance of friendly casualties, their 
method of silencing attacks by overwhelming airborne firepower demand an 
disproportional toll of innocent lives. This turns hesitance into hatred. The logic of 
unilateral preemption proves to be more complicated than had been foreseen: “hit and 
run” is not enough.  
Even a liberal like Steven Miller expected that the capture and destruction of larger 
amounts of illegal weapons, in particular of WMD, would remove “one of the greatest 
potential threats to US and regional security”.
39
 By now it is certain that there was no such 
threat. “How was the US so misled”, asked a New York Times editorial already on January 
12, 2004.
40
 Although in the meantime a Senate inquiry has put the entire blame on the 
CIA, it is still an open question whether American politicians were guiding CIA officials in 
fabricating a system of faked evidence or vice versa. 
Miller concludes his own analysis with thinly veiled irony:  
“According to advocates, in short, a successful war will remove Saddam from the scene, 
liberate Iraq, promote democracy in the Middle-East, enhance regional security, boost the 
international community by enforcing its will against a transgressor and buttress American 
power, influence and leadership. This is a lot of good to be achieved by a cheap war.”41 
 
 
 
38 Cf. William Pfaff, Reclaiming the U.S. army, in: International Herald Tribune, 24/25 June 2004. 
39 Miller, see above (footnote 13), p. 11. 
40 Here quoted from International Herald Tribune, January 15, 2004. 
41 Miller, see above (footnote 13), p. 11. 
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Reading this list of expectations against present-day realities is enough to assess the 
damage.  
5. Legal and Moral Considerations 
People on both sides of the Atlantic supported or opposed the Iraq war out of basic 
convictions. Politicians were not guided by legal or moral reasoning. Nevertheless, the 
intense moral and legal debate before and during the war went beyond day-to-day 
operational needs. The international order and its institutions, in particular the UN 
system, were at issue. Does the latter still provide answers to the new dangers of globalised 
terror, or does its almost unrestricted ban of the use of force now stand in the way of 
necessary military actions? Who shall judge on these questions? And if the existing law is 
inadequate, can considerations of moral philosophy replace it? 
In a “perfect” legal order the rules are accepted as binding by its subjects, not just 
because they are enforced but also because the subjects accept them as fair and useful. 
Such rules will normally reflect a minimum moral standard as well. A breach of the law 
would then also be morally reprehensible. In a “normal” modern state, its legal order is 
enforceable over its whole territory. We have become accustomed to measuring legal 
orders with such yardsticks: they are morally acceptable and universally enforced. But 
international law, without a universal law enforcement agency, does not measure up to 
these standards. Just as in medieval societies with their multi-polar distribution of power, 
legal rules could not be enforced everywhere but were nevertheless considered law. The 
case of the United Nations Charter (henceforth UNC) is similar. 
Every legal system, national or international, can come into conflict with changes in 
society. Since a society almost always develops more quickly than its legal system, this has 
to be accepted to a certain degree as inherent in the nature of law. For stability it is an 
essential element of any legal system. At least in theory, national law can be adapted easily 
to changing social circumstances. But an international treaty system is much more 
difficult to change. This requires complicated procedures, a consensus between all 
member states, and ratification, which poses a dilemma: since international systems may 
remain unchanged for a longer period than national laws, they may distance themselves 
more profoundly from reality; but on the other hand, they are much more difficult to 
amend. To a certain extent, this dilemma is inherent in any international treaty system. A 
government entering into such a system must be aware of it and may act in bad faith if it 
later evokes such developments for getting rid of its obligations under this system. Yet the 
gap between real needs and restricting norms may be so profound that to consider it 
obsolete and therefore illegitimate can be justifiable. This phenomenon is called 
“desuetude”. In such cases, law and ethics will fall apart and a state will be tempted, in 
case of need, to evoke ethical considerations to justify a breach of formal law. The 
tradition of a “just war” would be such a consideration. 
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Applying these general considerations to the war on Iraq, we observe first of all that 
American and British diplomats, far from declaring the UN legal system obsolete, have 
consistently referred to the Security Council as their source of legality. They claimed 
“continuing authority”42 based on previous Security Council resolutions. In a letter to the 
president of the Security Council on March 20, the American ambassador to the UN 
stated this case as follows:  
“Resolution 687 (1991) imposes a series of obligations on Iraq (…) that were conditions of 
the cease-fire established under it. It has long been recognized and understood that a 
material breach of these obligations removes the basis of the cease-fire and revives the 
authority to use force under Resolution 678 (1990).”43 
The British representative argued on similar lines. In the heated public debate on the 
relevance of the UN system it escaped most commentators that the two main participants 
in the war scrupulously legitimized their actions in terms of that system.44  
Another way of justifying the war would be the right of self-defense, which is 
recognised by Article 51 UNC as an “inherent right” in the event of an imminent armed 
attack against a state. In classical international law the term “imminent” was interpreted 
narrowly: the best example was the Six Days War of 1967 when the Egyptian army was 
already dislocated in battle order on the western side of the Suez canal before the Israeli 
air force struck. The NSS now maintains that in combating globalised terrorism self-
defense must be preemptive, because the forces of terrorism are invisible and strike 
without warning. The traditional term “imminent” should therefore be interpreted more 
broadly. This sounds reasonable. After all, there is no legal definition for the requirements 
of self-defense, which Article 51 recognizes as a pre-existing, an “inherent” right. The 
international community might have been convinced more easily if the NSS had 
presented this as an exception for emergencies but not as a new rule. In the words of 
Madeleine Albright, the NSS transformed “anticipatory self-defense – a tool every 
president has quietly held in reserve – into the centerpiece of its national security policy. 
This step was dangerously easy to misconstrue (do we really want a world in which every 
country feels entitled to attack any other that might some day threaten it?)”.45 Preemption 
also poses a problem of legal clarity and legal security. Of course, if a government obtains 
intelligence of terrorist preparations nobody will blame it if it acts decisively with 
 
 
 
42 Adam Roberts, Law and the Use of Force after Iraq, in: Survival, Vol. 45, No. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 31ff. 
43 Ibid., p. 33. 
44 That their arguments may seem “tortuous” and that they may be factually unfounded, is an entirely 
different matter. Adam Roberts cites the doubts against a continuation of the original authority: Have 
not the actors changed? (The coalition of 1991 was much larger than the actors of 2003.) Who is party to 
the armistice agreement (the United Nations or the states acting under its authority)? Can an authority 
use force to continue its existence for 13 years when the majority of the Council have changed their 
position and the situation has fundamentally changed? If the guiding principle, as Roberts asserts, “has 
to be that a resolution once passed, remains in effect”, should the Council not change its drafting 
practices and insert end dates in its decisions establishing enforcement measures? Ibid. 
45 Albright, see above (footnote 31), p. 4. 
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whatever forces necessary, also on foreign territory. But if the danger is so concealed that 
nobody discovers it, preemption moves dangerously near to aggression. Finally, under 
Article 51 the state under attack is only entitled to interim measures, whereas the Security 
Council remains responsible for the final settlement.  
But what happens if the United Nations System and the Security Council should 
become obsolete? In numerous political declarations, the American president has hinted 
at such a possibility when announcing that the United States would settle the matter at 
their own responsibility when “the Security Council failed to his responsibilities”. In order 
to support this thesis, Michael J. Glennon draws up long lists of cases of uncontrolled 
violence, which the Security Council could not prevent or terminate.46 However, most of 
the conflicts cited by Glennon were fought on a sub-state or extra-state level for which the 
Charter System was not devised.47 They are reasons to amend, not to abolish it. In 
Cambodia and East Timor the UN system successfully dealt with grave cases of sub-state 
wars or ethnic conflicts. There were also traditional wars between states, where the UN 
system intervened successfully: in the Korean war – by the General Assembly’s resolution 
“Uniting for Peace” of November 1950, and of course to repel the Iraqi aggression against 
Kuwait in 1991. Other cases, such as the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the occasional 
US incursions into their Caribbean and Central American backyards demonstrate the 
necessity of reinforcing, not abolishing the UN system, in particular the voting procedures 
in the Security Council. This is unfinished business, begun by President Wilson in 1917 
and continued after the Second World War by a consensus of the entire American 
political class. Not everybody will throw such great effort into the dustbin of history so 
light-heartedly as Richard Perle, who, elated by the beginning of war and the prospect of 
victory, spoke of the “international wreckage of the liberal conceit of safety through 
international law administered by international institutions”.48  
American political history shows a remarkable continuity of basic political concepts; 
there is little doubt that this great nation, in the light of future experiences and as a result 
of its continuing public debate, will return to co-operation in enforcing international law. 
After all, the American constitution in its Article VI paragraph 2 declares international 
treaties as part of the “supreme law of the land”. Clearly, the UNC is such a treaty. This 
point was ignored by the president’s advisors who let him repeatedly declare that he swore 
an oath on the US constitution to defend the security of his country, but not on the 
United Nations Charter – or that he had to ask anybody’s opinion as to whether the 
 
 
 
46 In a series of articles, mostly in American periodicals of international law, but also in Foreign Affairs. A 
good condensation is found in his German article “Der Traum” in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 
25, 2003, p. 7. See also Anne-Marie Sloughter, Good Reasons for going around the UN, in: International 
Herald Tribune, March 19, 2003. Evoking the precedent of NATO’s action against Kosovo, she calls the 
Iraq war “illegal but legitimate”. 
47 See, e.g., Michael J.Glennon, Why the Security Council failed, in: Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003,  
pp. 16ff. 
48 In his article, Thank God for the Death of the UN, The Guardian, March 21, 2003. 
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security of the United States was at stake. At the same time his representative at the 
United Nations, who knows better, claimed the war to be legal by “continued authority”. 
Weak as this argument was, it showed the desire to stay in the United Nations system 
which was not shared by the president’s political advisors. 
Russia, China and the majority of all European countries, in a meeting of the Security 
Council on March 26, 2003, officially declared the coalition’s war as “illegal”. If that 
judgment is accepted, the war was also aggression in terms of the resolution of the UN 
General Assembly of December 14, 1974.49 It was precisely to avoid these consequences 
that the German government refrained from such statements but declared the war as 
“unwarranted” (unangebracht) – partly to keep the last bridges to the United States intact, 
partly out of internal constitutional concerns: Article 26 of the Federal Basic Law prohibits 
Germany from supporting “wars of aggression”. To declare the war as illegal would 
therefore have forced the Federal Government to deny flyover rights or the use of bases in 
Germany. Few political forces in Germany would have gone so far – with the notable 
exception of a Party Congress of the Greens in November 2002, which restricted the room 
for maneuver of the Foreign Government in case of “aggression” and practically tabooed 
the mentioning of this term, and of Article 26.  
If the UNC is still valid and the war was illegal, it could not be justified by 
considerations of moral philosophy, but, for some, this may seem an overly formalistic 
approach not suited to the historic situation of the American nation, its passions and its 
recent experience. Under the shock of “9/11” an overwhelming majority of Americans, 
constantly being told that they were involved in a continuing defensive war, naturally 
looked for new culprits, demanded additional punishment, believed in a collusion 
between Islamist terrorists and that old enemy, Saddam Hussein, and for all these reasons 
deeply disapproved of the “obstruction” by other nations against such a course, which 
they considered entirely legitimate. Small wonder also that the Security Council, as the 
place where such “obstruction” was practiced came under suspicion, and that a need for 
alternative sources of legitimacy was felt. Scholars of ethics presented them in the “just 
war” theory. A prominent example of the use of that venerable doctrine to satisfy modern 
needs is the appeal by 90 American intellectuals entitled “What we’re Fighting for” issued 
in February 2002, during the Afghan campaign which, without even mentioning the 
United Nations, bases the American anti-terror warfare in this tradition. This declaration 
drew an emotional reprise from pacifist German intellectuals under the title “An 
International Order based on Peace and Justice looks different”.50  
The “Just War” doctrine was first developed by Saint Augustinus under the conditions 
of early Christianity, which, once it had become a state religion, needed intellectual 
 
 
 
49 General Assembly Resolution 3314 / XXIX of December 14, 1974. Note in particular Article 2 of that 
document: “The first use of armed force shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression.” 
50 The American letter is published under copyright of the Institute for American Values. The German 
letter can be found at the website of the University of Kassel: www.uni-kassel.de/fb10/frieden 
Doctrine and Practice of Preventive War 23
 
instruments to overcome the deep-seated pacifist feelings of its underground period.51 
War was admissible when it had a “just cause”, particularly the fight against infidels. In 
the 16th century, the late Spanish scholastics used the theory to humanize – with little 
success – the Spanish conquest overseas. Later, under the full development of the 
Westphalian system of sovereign states, the requirement of “just cause” was dissolved into 
a sovereign right of states to resort to war: the Italian lawyer Alberto Gentili first observed 
that two princes in a conflict might each have a “just cause”.52 The sovereign right of states 
to go to war was born. It was uncontested until the Briand-Kellog Pact in 1928 banned all 
wars between states. This ban, a diplomatic revolution, initially had its loopholes. Between 
then and 2001 all efforts by the civilized international community were directed at 
reinforcing this ban and defending it against totalitarian aggression. As imperfect as these 
efforts were in practice, never before were they declared outdated. Were they now 
replaced by the reintroduction of a unilateral sovereign right to war, this would be a 
radical shift for which the history of international political thought would offer no 
example. 
It is worrying that the advocates of the “just war” theory in contemporary American 
discourse rarely mention the United Nations Charter. Which authority abrogated its 
norms and replaced them by a set of antiquated ecclesiastical teaching remains unclear, as 
is the question of which authority decides on their applicability. “Just causes” can be easily 
construed, and few states resort to war without a deep conviction to have such a cause. 
Collective security systems are an attempt to control the anarchy stemming from 
competing convictions of this kind. But if we resort to the old Bishop of Hippo we 
logically should appoint a substitute for the Pope, too.53  
 
 
 
51 Cf. in particular the excellent oversight with numerous further references of Neta C. Crawford, Just War 
Theory and the US Counterterror War, electronic edition at www.absanet.org. Crawford correctly 
describes the many dilemmas which arise from the application of the just war theory to preemptive 
counter-terrorists strikes. She would have come to the same conclusions had she applied the legal 
tradition developed in interpreting Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Particularly meritorious is 
her analysis of the evidence needed to legitimate such preemptive strikes. She rejects the reversion of the 
burden of proof practiced by the administration but reduces the requirement for evidence to a “credible 
fear” (p.15). A good practical evaluation is given by former President Jimmy Carter who addresses the 
key problem of “legitimate authority”, which in his view lies with the Security Council: Jimmy Carter, 
An Attack is not yet justified, in: International Herald Tribune, March 10, 2003. 
52 Herfried Münkler, Die Neuen Kriege, Hamburg (Rowohlt), 2002, p. 113. 
53 This key problem of the mandating authority is addressed by Chris Brown, Self-defence in an Imperfect 
World, in: Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1, April 2003, pp. 2 - 9. Brown at least takes the 
UN System into account but argues that the Security Council is not an independent institution capable 
of setting legal precedents. Therefore, states have a right to evaluate their security risks independently 
and if necessary, to resort to “preemptive” military strikes. Brown concedes this right only for 
“preemption” against short-term dangers, not for “prevention” (long term developments). As stated 
above in chapter 1, this distinction is not universally accepted but may prove to be helpful. 
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6. Consequences for the European Union 
The Iraq crisis shed a cruel light on Europe’s common foreign and security policy. It 
mercilessly revealed Europe’s division over transatlantic relations and Middle-East policy. 
Member states had always considered their political relations with the United States (as 
opposed to trade relations) as their domaine réservée. Nevertheless, never before had they 
opposed each other so strongly about these relations. And never before were they unable 
to find durable compromise formulae even after the event. When the foreign ministers at 
their Athens meeting in January 2003 finally reached a compromise by referring to 
Security Council Resolution 1441 (of which they had conflicting interpretations), the 
disagreement was laid bare three days later in a public declaration of support of the 
American position by eight EU member and candidate states. Unilateral action and 
individual declarations dominated the issues for months. As Thomas Risse reminds us, 
this was the first time that the EU members fought out their differences in public; in 
earlier crises they had always been able to hide their differences by “agreeing to disagree”.54 
On the other hand, individual EU members have rarely been exposed to so much 
pressure, public anger and retribution from Washington, and even its loyal supporters, 
above all the British prime minister, found little reward for their risks and efforts. The 
crisis has highlighted both the need for European cohesion and the absence of it. 
The deeper reasons for this development are, firstly, that the EU member states never 
discussed, much less acted on, a common attitude towards the US which was a jealously 
guarded core-interest for most of them. Secondly, the deep conceptional rift between the 
two sides of the Atlantic has to be noted. The official strategy of the United States, as laid 
out in the NSS, concentrates on one central danger, terrorism, relies on military power for 
controlling it, and postulates for the good of the world the continuation of American 
dominance, which will be defended by military means if necessary. By contrast, the 
strategy of the European Union is twofold. Firstly, it establishes a pacified area of co-
operative stability within its boundaries, and secondly it tries to project this as a model to 
neighboring areas, more by inducement than by coercion. All these efforts are based on 
gradualism: gradualism in subject matters, in economics starting with coal and steel and 
ending with a complete Economic Union, then adding agriculture, and turning to new 
areas such as legal co-operation and immigration; gradualism of methods (from loose 
inter-governmental co-operation to supranational structures; gradualism in participation 
(subsidiary: not all tasks, such as the currency union, can or will be tackled by all members 
simultaneously); gradualism in membership, new members are admitted one by one, 
according to their economic and political maturity. For over forty years this strategy 
proved successful, it led to a degree of integration that makes military conflict between 
member states unthinkable. The projection of this model to Central Europe is about to be 
 
 
 
54 Thomas Risse, Auf dem Wege zu einer Gemeinsamen Außenpolitik? Der Verfassungsentwurf und die 
Europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, in: Integration 2003, Vol. 4, 2003, pp. 564ff. 
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completed. In South East Europe it has a chance to succeed. It is networking all over 
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean. These efforts went on reasonably 
well. Even the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (the Barcelona process) is now gaining 
prominence as a model for a freely agreed civilian-centered cooperative system for the 
Greater Middle East. 
In order to make this strategy successful it had to be constantly oversold as a series of 
grand designs. Resounding names had to be found for small practical steps. To turn to the 
narrower field of this study, “European Political Co-operation” was one day in 1993 re-
baptized “Common Foreign and Security Policy”. But the practitioner in the field felt little 
difference. Every time the European leaders were confronted with the overwhelming 
military might of the United States they solemnly declared their will to increase European 
defense efforts – particularly after the show of American power in the Kosovo campaign at 
the Cologne summit in June 1999. At their Helsinki meeting a year later, the European 
Council defined “headline goals”, i.e., commitments on the number of troops made 
available for common tasks. The tasks were defined at an earlier Petersberg Meeting, and 
range from emergency aid in natural catastrophes to “peace enforcing measures”, i.e., 
military interventions (see Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the European Union in 
the Nice version – still in force –, hereinafter TEU). Such measures normally require a 
Security Council mandate – without it the EU would almost certainly not reach the 
required unanimity for a decision on the measure (Article 23, paragraph 1, TEU). This 
means that the United States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, in practice 
has a veto over independent European power projection. In the long debate with the US 
and Turkey on autonomous planning and command capacities for the European forces or 
the use of NATO assets for these aims (“Berlin-plus”), the Europeans lost sight of this 
basic point.  
Questions of war and peace have rarely been discussed and never decided in European 
institutions. Thus, before the first Golf War in early 1991, British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher advocated her hard line bilaterally while Chancellor Kohl also 
explained his difficulties in private, citing, in particular, the difficulties for ratification of 
the Two Plus Four Treaty in Moscow. In April 1999, during a trip to the US, Prime 
Minister Blair advocated the use of ground troops against Serbia in Kosovo publicly, to 
the embarrassment of the German Government. There were several consultations on the 
use of ground troops, including one between the defense ministers of the “Western Five” 
(US, UK, France, Italy and Germany) but none in the EU.
55
 In the Iraq crisis each major 
actor took up his position without any prior European consultation: not Prime Minister 
Blair when he publicly pledged his support in early July 2002, not Chancellor Schröder 
when he declared his opposition in August. There was no European consultation before 
the British tabled the Second Resolution in January 2003 and not even before President 
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Chirac declared his veto. Co-ordination and information on transactions in the Security 
Council as foreseen by Article 19 TEU were not practiced. And for three months at least, 
the European scene was marked by sharp controversy with no trace of the solidarity 
pledged in Article 11 of the Treaty. Maybe this provision was not even violated in a 
technical sense because it presupposes a common European position, which simply did 
not exist.  
After these experiences, an honest discussion on chances and limits for a European 
defense should be possible. Thomas Risse points out how a future European foreign 
minister could use his skills of consultation and organization to achieve more coherence.
56
 
This could again open up a gradual process. It remains, of course, to be seen whether the 
European Constitution will enter into force (not before 2007 if all goes well) and whether 
the future foreign minister has the willpower to use his expertise in the way advocated by 
Risse. A cynic might add that member states can control such developments by choosing 
someone with limited leadership capacities. 
Romano Prodi, ever the optimist, sees a European war-making capacity at the end of 
the process when in a speech in Paris in May 2001 he remarked:  
“To become a real actor in the domain of security the Union must answer certain questions, 
which so far have been evaded, such as the question for which cause would we be prepared 
to die in common? […] From what point on will human lives have to be put at risk?”
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Progress in European integration was often achieved against formidable odds. Similar 
developments in the defense sector cannot be excluded. But there are good arguments for 
concentrating on a “European stability policy” and limit military ambitions to improved 
co-operation. Prime Minister Blair had this in mind when he said in his Cardiff speech 
(November 28, 2002): “unless it is clear from the outset it is complementary to NATO, 
working with it, adding to our defense capabilities not substituting Europe for NATO 
then it will never work”. But other European voices expressed the wish, “to avoid the roles 
of the Athenians in ancient Rome, i.e., to subordinate ourselves to the wishes of a new 
empire.”58 Is a military build-up the right strategy to achieve this aim? 
The Council of the European Union on December 12, 2003 issued a paper on 
“European Security Strategy” (hereinafter ESS), that avoids similar rhetoric. It refrains 
from demanding more integration in the military field, instead it demands the “systematic 
 
 
 
56 Risse, see above (footnote 54), p. 570. 
57 Speech before the Institute d´étude Politiques, Paris, 29 May 2001, http://europa.eu.int/comm 
58 Report of the Foreign Relations Commission of the European Parliament accepted by the Parliament of 
March 27, 2003, quoted by Gregor Schöllgen, Der Auftritt, Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne, 
Berlin/München (Propyläen) 2003, p. 166 (retranslated by the author). Unlike Gregor Schöllgen, I fail to 
discover a sense of purpose in comparable phrases. The comparison is revealing, nevertheless: It is quite 
possible that the Europeans, like the Athenians before, have lost the eagerness to win wars. They might 
resign themselves to a honorable but secondary role in an empire but might want to dissimulate this 
situation by posturing and making resounding statements. 
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use of pooled and chaired assets” and “the transformation of our militaries (note the 
plural) into more flexible mobile forces”. Under the heading “Policy implications for 
Europe” it states that “the European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign 
policy and effective crisis management.” After this rather optimistic presentation it 
demands: “if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be 
more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.” On this 
last point the ESS adds that “our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with 
the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further capability and 
increase its coherence”.59 
Thus the lowest common denominator between Europeans is to improve their military 
posture to improve their standing in Washington. But how realistic is such an approach? 
As shown above, common and independent military action cannot be expected from the 
European Union under present circumstances against a determined position of the 
United States. This kind of action would, under present and future EU-rules, require a 
unanimous decision of the European council. This in turn would be possible only if a 
security council mandate existed. Such a mandate would require approval by the United 
States as a permanent member of the council. In addition, European action depends on 
NATO facilities, above all, command structures. Again, a unanimous decision of the 
NATO Council would be needed to make them available under a complicated procedure 
called “Berlin-plus”. Even if the present lack of transport aircraft and satellite 
communication were rectified, non EU-NATO-powers, like the US, Turkey, and Canada, 
are in a position to control independent European action. 
It is precisely because of this dependence on NATO command assets that the summit 
at Tervuren on April 29, 2003 proposed the nucleus of an EU military headquarters. The 
aim was to achieve “autonomy” of EU decisions from the United States. As is known, the 
four participants of Tervuren (France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg) invited the 
United Kingdom to participate in this process to make it viable. Finally, the British 
negotiated with the other European partners, and with Washington in parallel, a 
compromise, which a high-ranking NATO-officer contently called “first class burial”, for 
the idea of a European headquarters was reached.
60
 The American Ambassador to NATO, 
Nicholas Burns, had polemized untiringly against that “serious menace to NATO”. 
To sum up, European military action would be possible only in minor cases where 
American interests are not involved, or where the United States would like others to do 
the military work for them. These are precisely the kind of tasks which the common 
European defense policy presently shoulders: limited peacekeeping in former Yugoslavia, 
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crisis intervention in Central Africa of the kind of Operation Artemis in June 2003 to 
secure the provincial capital of Bunia. As always, the chorus of advocates of an 
incremental approach celebrates this as a promising beginning. The question is whether 
more can be expected and whether such action involves any particular political effort. 
They are useful but will they really serve the purpose of making Europe a valuable partner 
of the United States in security matters? On the contrary, at least the Bush administration 
is likely to continue to oppose an independent European security structure. For a change 
in this situation, one has to imagine a scenario under which EU members are unanimous 
on a major conflict the resolution of which requires military force, which the United 
States, out of weakness or for lack of interest will let go unchallenged – or, to make the 
scenario even less realistic, the 25 member states of the Union are determined to act even 
without a United Nations mandate. 
Of course, the European countries have shown themselves in the past to be capable of 
rapid structural changes in cases of sudden need. The development of their cooperation in 
internal security from intergovernmental cooperation to a “space of freedom, security, 
and law” are a case in point. If the United States really did need a partner in leadership, be 
it by imperial overstretch or by catastrophic developments, the European Union would 
find itself forced to fill the void if as, for instance, in South East Europe or the Middle 
East, its own vital interests are at stake. Washington would then, and probably only then, 
be prepared to accept Europe as a security partner.  
So much for autonomous capacity for military action. What about the basis of it, a 
common political attitude on main issues? It is quite possible that the Iraq experience has 
created the preconditions of a European public opinion, as Jürgen Habermas observed.
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It is interesting in this context that in most publications on US-EU relations “the 
Europeans” are invariably equaled with those who opposed the war – although more 
European governments supported than opposed it. At the same time, the last elections to 
the European parliament showed the discontent of almost all European nations with their 
respective governments. A European identity can, however, not be built on negatives, be it 
alienation from America or unhappiness at home. The absolute priority for all European 
efforts should therefore be given to the domestic (economic, financial, social) tasks. The 
hope to gain American respect or a greater say in world affairs by more combat-ready 
troops is ill-founded in purpose and unrealistic in practice. 
Military missions apart, will Europe be able to speak with a common voice, with clear 
positions on really serious matters such as the Middle-East peace process and the 
American role in it? There is reason to assume that the political leaders continue to pay 
lip-service to such ambitious goals and that their aides busily paper over the existing 
fundamental differences, that the venerable practice of structural tinkering will continue 
to hide political determination – and that the European Union think tanks, university 
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institutions, and learned periodicals will spare no effort to analyze each new document as 
a step towards greater unity. Changing this situation seems hardly possible because all 
politicians share an interest in maintaining the appearance of acting together in the 
security field while avoiding real sacrifices in resources or sovereignty in order to create it: 
the Germans, who are eager to maintain their low level of military spending, the French 
for keeping their freedom of action in their African domaine réservée, and the British in 
order to maintain their privileged position in Washington. A serious political analysis 
should deal with this smoke screen as a political reality in the way smoke is a reality, but 
concentrate on the promising capacities of the European Union as a civilian power. 
